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Abstract
Since 2001 the aviation industry is continuously facing a
growing problem of safety and security within air travel pro-
cedure. The restrictions had been taken seriously, new rules and
technologies surfaced. Passengers are often defined as wrong-
doers but the airport staff has much better conditions to do any
kind of attack or pilferage. To avoid any possibility of attack
the airport’s staff have to be controlled and monitored. With the
combination of video camera, Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tag and biometrical identification it is solvable.
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Introduction
Today more and more business and leisure travelers are flying
to their destinations, the airports are operating at their peak ca-
pacity to be able to satisfy the continuously increasing demand.
Since the 11th of September 2001 security is an increase concern
at airports, the fight against the terrorist attacks is prevalent and
more emphasis lies on ensuring the passengers’ security during
the flight procedure within the terminal building and on board.
The security restrictions are taken more seriously and the se-
curity industry entered its golden age. There were rules before
too, but they were not taken so strict. The world and the avi-
ation sector fears of terrorist attacks, the industry is trying to
implement the best technologies to detect explosives, suspicious
articles and behavior. Most airports, governmental and interna-
tional organizations are aiming to introduce very strict security
controls to reduce or eliminate any kind of threat to the pas-
sengers. In some way everyone is considered to be a potential
terrorist or wrongdoer. The security staff’s job is to recognize
queer items, behavior. The security staff attends trainings re-
lated to recognize suspicious behavior and objects. The pas-
sengers have to bear much congestion, long queues at security
check as this process is not too fast even if the industry tries
to implement the quickest solutions. However, not only a pas-
senger can be a wrongdoer or a terrorist, for staff member it
is much easier to take anything inside airport’s restricted areas.
The airports’ security service levels are evaluated by audits. In
case the audit was unsuccessful, they give a time period and a
list of the problems to the airport operators. The airport is fully
equipped with video cameras but that is not identifying the peo-
ple on screen. The security industry is constantly improving the
level and effectiveness of the screening, trying to come out with
new products which are more and more efficient in recognizing
all kind of materials and things in a person’s body or in a bag.
1 Today’s security measures
In most of the world’s airports everybody can enter the de-
parture and arrival hall of the terminal building while the transit
hall is reserved for passengers only after passing the strict rules
of the border control and security check, the order depends on
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the airport. Mainly in African (e.g. Kenya) or Asian (e.g. In-
dia) countries the visitors are not allowed to enter the terminal
building, there are separate waiting halls next to the terminal. To
enter the terminal building the passenger has to show the flight
ticket and (together with his/her baggage) goes through a first
security check. For example in Madras (India) the visitor can
pay an extra fee to enter the check-in, but the waiting area is
strictly separated from the check-in queue.
The terminal buildings are monitored by video camera and the
people are informed of this monitoring by a sign at the entrance
door: ‘The building is monitored by a security camera’. Both
passengers and baggage are passing through a security screen-
ing after the check-in to ensure that they lack any suspicious ar-
ticles on board. After entering the Departure hall the movement
of each person is recorded by a video until leaving the terminal.
Some airports possess 360 degree camera, but this is new and
still not common. The passenger, staff for restricted airport ar-
eas undergo metal detector test at security checks, in case of a
problem the person will be checked separately, to speed up the
manual check the staff can use the mobile metal detector. In
some countries the passengers are checked twice.
The hand and checked in baggage, staff’s belongings, cargo
and postal matters pass through security checks of a 3D x-ray.
The checked in baggage undergoes a security check right after
check-in. Afterwards it can be directed instantly to the aircraft or
it stays in a waiting position somewhere in the baggage sorting
area. Transfer baggage passes through security control too after
offloading from the aircraft at the baggage sorting before the
new sorting would take place. But right before the luggage is
taken to the aircraft; there is no extra security control. So it is
easy here to struggle something into it or take out some items.
That area is equipped with cameras but if the worker is with the
back to the camera nobody sees what is happening.
The staff for restricted airport area has special authorizations
for entering. Their past will be scrutinized for the last five year.
The personnel working at the airport is passing through as strict
security control as the passengers themselves by the same tech-
nology, they have strict entrance authorization and are watched
all the time by a video camera. The authorizations are given
according to his field of work, for the places he needs to have
access to fulfil job well by the airport authority. The personnel
of sensitive areas such as the baggage sorting or the cargo area
have to be checked as well very strictly to avoid any mishan-
dling (e.g. steal something from the baggage or the shipment,
put something into it) of the baggage or shipment waiting for a
flight.
The staff is having a smart card for identification. To enter a
restricted zone he has to put his smart card next to reader placed
in front the access of that area. If he has permission to enter
the door opens, if not it stays closed. Anybody can use any-
one’s smart card as at the entrance there is just a card reader but
without any other kind of personal identification (e.g. password,
PIN code, biometrics). So in reality nobody really can be sure
who enters the special area. The video camera inside the area
is not showing who was entering just a person. And the person
supervising the CCTV footage does not know everyone’s access
authorizations. To trick it out is very easy.
Some airports, especially in the USA are introducing biomet-
rical identification parallel with the smart cards. The extra iden-
tification is placed next to the card reader before entering the
restricted area. Most commonly used biometrical identification
method for this is the IRIS recognition, facial recognition or fin-
gerprint or their combination. The biometrical data are stored
on the smart card and while supervising the access permission it
is checked for matching and access permission.
Human factor can be the key to effective security but a weak
link too. Not just the gullibility, good temper but money, good
looking item, bribery etc. can lead to failure of the security
restrictions and technologies. Lost uniforms and ID cards, re-
peated journalistic intrusions, incompetent screeners, and inop-
erative monitoring cameras are just sample examples how to
trick out the security technology [6].
Many aircraft hijackings during the 1980’s were easy to make
it happen for the terrorist due to the complicity of the airport
staff [6].
In December 2001 at Paris CDG Airport Richard Reid
boarded a flight into the USA with explosive device concealed
in his shoes. He could board the aircraft due to 2 reasons: the
limitations of the metal detector and the laxity of the authority
[6]).
In August 2004 two airplanes departing from Moscow’s Do-
modedovo Airport were brought by 2 Chechen women. Not just
because of the technology’s failure, the police neglect and cor-
ruption allowed the activities of local mafia elements conducting
regular criminal activity within the airport. The police officers
were very cheap, they costed only US S170 [6].
Australian authorities identified airport staff as being behind
drug trafficking at Sydney Airport in June 2005 [6].
In September 2005 at Vienna International Airport armed
people went through the security check. Similar things hap-
pened in London, Warsaw, Philadelphia, Ottawa etc. [6].
2007 Royal Canadian Mounted Police inquiry claimed that 8
major airports were integrated into organized crime. Hundreds
of police files and hundreds of people were involved in criminal
activities, including 300 current or former employees [6].
Screening baggage is implemented to detect terrorist and their
attacks but it also helped the growth of the airport-based crimi-
nalities to identify the items worth stealing [6].
2 Radio Frequency Identification as the new technol-
ogy
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology in-
corporated into a silicon chip that emits a radio signal which
matches a user-defined serial number with an item. In this case
the item is the personnel’s badge. This number can be read at a
distance by an antenna.
Per. Pol. Transp. Eng.10 Katalin Emese Bite
The main differences between the RFID and the smart card
technology are listed below:
• The active tag is read by an antenna continuously, it does not
need to be contacted physically to the reader.
• In case of passive tag it is the same, the only difference is that
it will be only read in the field of the gate but it has not be
contacted to the reader, so faster identification and access is
feasible which is important in emergency situation.
• It is able to talk-write to a single tag allowing updating the
status of the staff authorization anytime while the smart card
needs to be changed.
• With an active tag the monitoring and tracing of the person
is possible, the smart card only gives the information were he
has entered.
• Amap of his moving is possible to be generated by integrating
it to a GIS, not just points of his entrances can be visualized.
The security of tags and databases raise important considera-
tions concerning the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the data on the tags, in the databases, and in how this informa-
tion is being protected.
The aviation industry is already trialing RFID in the baggage
handling, but it has unlimited features.
Another useful application of the RFID technology is for the
access control of vehicle to airport operational areas [9]. At Lon-
don Heathrow airport American Airlines’ access control sys-
tem prevents unauthorized drivers from using American Airline
equipment as the driver can only start the vehicles engine by
using Airport Security pass which is recognized by the use of
RFID technology supplied by Vehicle Telematics Information
System (VTIS) [7].
2.1 Using RFID tag for staff
The airport’s terminal building and outside areas are full with
video cameras recording the movement of the people passing
by. On the video screen it is only possible to see that a person
is moving but it is not possible to identify the person. In the
USA some airports use facial recognizers implemented into the
video cameras within the airport (especially where passengers
are moving around). Today’s technology is still not perfect in
this regard. If the person who is passing by the camera is not
looking directly into it or the total face cannot be seen even with
zooming on it, then the facial recognizer is unable to identify
the person. Even if it looks into the camera but something small
has changed on its face (e.g. taking some pills to have the face
deformed) or especially with bigger changes it is unable to iden-
tify the person. Even in the best case when the person looks into
it, the facial recognizer needs to have a very high resolution to
identify the person correctly, and the accuracy rate is quite low.
The only reason for using facial recognition implemented into
the video camera is that does not need physical contact and can
be implemented in crowd situations [2]. In the future, ear shape
recognition could be combined with facial recognition to iden-
tify the people from CCTV footage. Ear shape recognition has
an accuracy rate of 99% according to laboratory test [2].
The staff’s smart card only shows where he has entered but
it is not giving a continuous information about his statement.
It is getting more common within the aviation industry that the
smart card is containing the biometrical information of the staff.
These are varying between IRIS, facial or fingerprint recognition
or their mixture.
Giving RFID tags embedded into badge combined with bio-
metrical data of the laborer to the worker would secure the sys-
tem. The video shows the movements of the staff viewed and his
tag number shows who he is and if he is allowed to be there. At
the entrance to a restricted area his authorization and personal-
ity is confirmed too or not depending if he is the badge’s owner
or not. Integrated into GIS software it can visualize differently
and map of the movement flow can be drawn automatically. It
is possible to store the data long time, in case of problems it is
possible to find out who was there at that time. Time measure-
ment can be taken too. For example if the staff is too long at a
baggage, but he is with his back to the camera and there is later
an announcement that something is missing from that bag, hav-
ing the bags with RFID BagTags too, it is very easy to find out
who made the crime.
In case of an emergency situation (e.g. pointing out a terrorist
movement, putting something into a bag or aircraft) where the
security personnel sees the crime in real-time on the monitor he
can overwrite the wrongdoer’s tag and cancel his authorization
for exiting that area and the wrongdoer can be caught. The soft-
ware can give alarms as well. In emergency situation it can map
automatically where the alarm is and draw the quickest way to
that place.
Of course the staff’s privacy must be protected. The personal
information of the staffmember and his/her location should only
be accessed by the security coordinator if there is a problem or
the system is alerting an emergency situation. To avoid mishan-
dling of the personal data a one-way code must be applied and
the tag of the staff member should be only activated when it en-
ters the restricted and authorization needed parts of the airport.
To ensure the staff’s privacy rights apart the standardization
further disposition can be made:
1 The tracking of the worker with RFID tag should facilitate
the security issues of the airport and global industry. Due to
privacy reasons the system on the monitor would only show
RFID tag number. There is a need for 2 linked databases. First
database contains the RFID tag number and access informa-
tion, second one the RFID tag number and the passenger per-
sonal information. In case of trouble with a worker the second
database opens automatically. The personnel at the monitor-
ing must contact the security agent. The personal information
of the worker should only be accessed by the security or po-
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lice coordinator. Of course only authorized personnel would
be able to access the database of the RFID tag and its current
owner.
2 Attacks against the mishandling of the worker’s RFID tag can
be a radio signal which will be decoded behind the passen-
ger by another person having a reader. To avoid this one-
way code is a solution. A one-way code is a code, non-
decodable for a decoder not having the special airport system
code. Hence another person cannot retrieve any data from
another passenger’s tag.
3 The tag should be activated only when it enters a territory
which requires authorization needed.
Airports should be the owners of the new technology and the au-
thorization personnel could anytime change the permissions of
each staff member. For the permanent staff a permanent card
with RFID with the owner’s biometrical information will be
issued. For people rarely entering the airport’s restricted area
would get the card issued with every entrance, so the informa-
tion on the card would be deleted automatically at the exit and
for a new person re-used. The implantation costs and the tag
prices are too high but the effort and money spent on aviation
security is worth it. It is simpler to identify the violator and to
take action immediately. It is much more efficient, less compli-
cated to find out who is the violator.
2.2 Protection against baggage pilferage
In case of pilferage of the baggage a damage report must be
filled. The claim department must consult frequently with the
security staff to guard against fraudulent claims, summarize the
experience, and distribute the summary with an emphasis on
where the losses arose. Tracking luggage through the whole
flight procedure with RFID tags enables to find out where the
luggage was stored for how long time. Besides measuring the
airport infrastructure it is a great method to measure if the air-
port personnel are pilfering the baggage or not. In case the lug-
gage was stored at a place for long where nothing was around for
a while, and afterwards the passenger reports that something is
missing from the bag, the system can automatically track whole
journey of the luggage to find out where it could have been tam-
pered with. But this can be much better checked if the personnel
is traced with RFID tag as well. The video camera of the bag-
gage sorting, if it well placed, shows if one of staff is respon-
sible for it, but it is not capable to show the person’s identity.
With the RFID the identity would be clear as well. One thing is
to track passenger with RFID tags for flight security reasons to
avoid that he is taking something suspicious on board; another is
to make sure that none of the airport personnel is putting some-
thing secretly into the luggage of a passenger or into the baggage
compartment.
3 Conclusion
Much time, effort and money is spent on improving the avi-
ation security. Many times the people tend to think that the at-
tacker or the offender can only be one or more passenger. In
reality it is much easier for a staff member to smuggle in the
drugs or any form of explosives into the restricted area of an
airport and then continue it into an aircraft. Meanwhile the pas-
sengers are exposed stricter rules, long queues; hassle at the se-
curity check, the journey becomes less convenient. The airport
to lower the queues and the proceeding time needs to implement
and operate with more and more security infrastructure.
The costs generated by baggage loss, broken luggage or when
something is missing from the hold baggage’s content are very
high for the airlines as they have to compensate the passenger
for loss. The application of RFID technology would monitor the
staff and take immediately the right action in emergency situ-
ations. With GIS software combined the emergency situations
can be mapped on point and sent to the right people avoiding the
problem. The airport can use the technology’s infrastructure on
different areas of the airport: baggage and passenger handling,
cargo, ground support equipment etc., the features of RFID are
unlimited which makes it in long term rentable.
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